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Nonviolence and Authoritarian Regimes 
QSHB 
PROMOTING SOCIAL CHANGE IN AUTHORITARIAN RmIMll 'l'HROUOH 
ACTIVE NONVIOLENCE 
by Ron Mock 
February 1986 was a month of sudden, startling, and 
essentially nonviolent triumph over detested, violent 
dictators Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and 
Jean-Claude Th1valier of Haiti. In just three months, events 
in both countries unfolded in dramatic fashion, ending in the 
dissolution of dictatorships which had seemed invincible as 
late as November, 1985. 
Clearly something powerful was at work, and it was not 
the violent revolution both dictators had publicly described 
a5 the principal threat to the stability of their 
governments. In the euphoria prevailing after the 
d.i.ct.a.torships collapsed, many hailed these two transitions 
as proof of the power of nonviolence. According to this 
view, active nonviolence had been successful in 
traditionally violent cultures, proving its power as the 
proper strategy against entrenched, violent forces of 
oppression. 
But do the events of February 1986 deserve their 
reputations as something unprecedented in the history of the 
two nations? Were they really triumphs of popular active 
nonviolence? What role. if any, was played by religious 
pacifism in encouraging active nonviolence as a strategy 
against authoritarian regimes? What lessons may be learned 
by those who would promote active nonviolence as a means to 
enhance democracy and social justice? 
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These questions are difficult. To answer them I '-70rked 
with Lon Fendall, Director of the Center for Peace Learninq 
at George Fox College, to study the events in Haiti and th~ 
Philippines leading up to February 1986, talkinq to 
eyewitnesses and reviewing printed accounts. Pbss1ble 
historical and cultural precedents for the use of nonviolence 
in the two countries were identified, and attempts were made 
to trace the sources for the ideas of active nonviolence that 
were used in late 1985 and early 1986. This paper reports a 
summary of what we learned about the Haitian and Filipino 
experiences <note 1). 
1. In both Haiti and the Philipiine1, the ideas and practices 
of principled active nonvio ence were at the core of a 
democratic popular movement that took leadership in ousting 
the dictators. 
The popular movements in the two countries were 
dissimilar in many ways. Haiti's movement never developed 
visible political leadership, the role played so prominently 
by Benigno and Corazon Aquino in the Philippines. The 
Haitian movement was almost purely a "grass--rooLs" 
organization, initiated and sustained by lay and clerical 
leaders at the parish level (primarily in the Catholic 
Church), and by various local leaders in the community 
cooperative movement. Although some Catholic bishops played 
prominent roles in encouraging the Church as a whole to 
support the popular movement and its democr·atic aspirations, 
and in helping to publicize the movement's views, the 
primary energy for the movement came from a decentralized 
and almost invisible network of local leaders. 
In the Philippines. on the other hand, non-violence 
activists had direct access to the leaders of a powerful, 
centralized, elite-based opposition political organization. 
Wealthy politician Beniqno Aquino was an advocate of 
non-violent strategy as part of his efforts to undermine 
Ferdinand Marco~. Corazon Aquino also c~me to 0mbrace 
non-violence as a viable strategy in the struggle against 
Marcos, although she clearly never became a pacif izt. 
In choosing non-violence, Corazon Aquino allied herself 
with an organization called AKKAPKA \''Action for Peace 1nd 
Justice">. AKKAPKA provided non-violence training, worl<ed tc 
develop nonviolent means of re3i~ting oppression, and ended 
up counseling Aquino and Cardinal Jaime Sin on how they might 
organize a non-violer1t strategy to oust Marcos after he stole 
the February 1986 election. There was no counterpart to 
AKKAPKA in Haiti. 
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2. In both countrie1, it wa1 crucial that fa1t and reliable 
means of communication were available amonq nonviolence 
activists at key junctures. 
In both countries, activists in ecclesiastical and 
development organizations were also active in the nonviolent 
movement. But in Haiti, where visible national leadership 
was lacking and where the movement was not very active in 
Port-au-Prince, these other organizations were critical 
channels of information and coordination. Movement leaders 
communicated primarily through Church channels that had been 
established for other purposes. 
Other communication was had by mail, and more 
significantly in the weeks leading up to Duvalier's 
departure, by radio --at times using coded messages. Access 
to independent radio stations like the Catholic Radio Soleil 
and the Protestant Radio Lumiere was crucial to the 
movement's success. Demonstrators around the country relied 
on these channels of communication for motivation and 
inspiration for their local protest activities. 
National networks, ecclesial and otherwise, also 
existed in the Philippines. In fact, whereas in Haiti the 
Catholic Church was the only national institution other than 
the Army and the Duvalierist private security forces, the 
Tonton Macoutes, the Philippines was comparatively rich in 
non-governmental institutions. Yet they were not so critical 
in the Philippines, where the central events in the popular 
movement took place in Manila in conjunction with the 
military mutiny led by Fidel Ramos and Juan Ponce Enrile. In 
that situation, communication among key parties was 
face-to-face, and by telephone, even while Corazon Aquino was 
on the island of Cebu, far from Manila. 
However, as in Haiti, independent radio stations were 
important to the popular movement. Without the Catholic-run 
Radio Veritas, it would have been difficult to issue an 
effective call for tens of thousands of people to surround 
the military rebel stronghold, frustrating nonviolently the 
government's attempts to attadc the rebels. When Radio 
Veritas left the air in the midst of the crisis on Sunday 
eveniny February 23 lpossibly to avoid its destruction by 
government forces>, Catholic reporters found another outlet 
in radio station DZRJ <re-christened "Radio Bandido"), which 
proved to be a critical source of information until Marcos' 
departure on Tuesday. 
3. Both countrie1 had 
nonviolent tactics. 
con1ciou1 impact on 
Marco1 and Duvalier. 
some hi1torical experience with active 
But the1e experiences had little 
the popular moveaent1 to brinf down 
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During Haiti's long history of independence \since 1804) 
there never has been a constitutional and democratic transfer 
of power. But on three occasions extra-constitutional 
transitions had been accomplished by concerted application of 
nonviolent tactics. In 1934, a series of nonviolent actions 
(strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations> succeeded in 
hastening the departure of U.S. Marines that had occupied 
Haiti since 1915. In 1946, another similar campaign led to 
the resignation of corrupt President Elie Lescot. And in 
1956, General Paul Magloire lost his seat in the president's 
office as a result of demonstrations, riots, and strikes in 
Port-au-Prince. <Magloire's fall led to Haiti's only fair 
direct election of a president -- Francois Duvalier.> 
But by 1985, 29 years had passed since th~ last of these 
"successful" nonviolent campaigns. The potential power of 
these experiences as inspiration to the movement against 
Duvalier seems to have been largely untapped. In several 
interviews with participants and Haitian observers of the 
anti-Duvalier popular movement, no one ever mentioned these 
earlier cases as precedent for their own work, even when 
asked to identify any precedents in Haitian hist'ory for 
active nonviolence. No reference to any connection between 
the mid-century movements and the movement of the 1980's has 
been recorded in the published material examined for this 
research. 
This makes it difficult to assess the effects of 
previous Haitian experience on the fall of Duvalier. The 
movement in 1985-86 was starkly different from the earlier 
campaigns. They had all been confined mostly to 
Port-au-Prince in support of particular aspirants for the 
president's office. But the anti-Duvalier movement was 
decentralized to provincial cities, hardly affecting the 
capital, and was not supporting any particular candidate for 
president <note 2>. In addition, according to at least one 
eyewitness to some of the earlier campaigns, the 
anti-Duvalier movement was much more principled in its 
conscious adoption of nonviolence as an overall strategy, 
while the earlier campaigns were just being pragmatic in 
what was possible without too much bloodshed. In any event, 
more contemporaneous influences were more important in 
shaping the anti-Duvalier popular movement than were Haiti's 
own historical experiences. 
The Philippines had a more distant but more distinct 
historical experience of systematic and principled 
nonviolence. It was embodied in the life story of Jose Rizal, 
martyred in the 1890's for his advocacy of independence from 
Spain. The parallel between Rizal's nonviolent nationalism 
and that of Benigno Aquino was not lost on many Filipinos: 
both were exiled for their opposition to an authoritarian 
government, both became proponents of systematic nonviolence 
as the way to achieve liberations, and both were killed by 
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government forces soon after their return to the Philippines 
from exile. Another difference was the essentially 
nonviolent way in which the Philippines achieved independence 
from the United States in the 1940's after World War II, 
contrasted with Haiti's heritage of horrific violence leading 
to its independence. Yet, once again, more contemporary 
sources seem to have been uppermost in Filipino minds as they 
contemplated a nonviolent campaign to oust Marcos. 
'· AlthoUfh IOMI ••P•Ctl of indiflftOUI culture in l&Ch 
country were useful in helping people understand principles 
of nonviolence, foreigners were the mo1t important 1ource1 of 
the idea1 that led to commitment to nonviolence a1 an overall 
strategy. 
Of the two countries, Haiti had the most distinctly 
violent path to independence. The violent pattern had been 
repeated many times before the American Marines intervened 
in 1915 to stop a particularly ferocious cycle of domestic 
political violence. Yet Haiti under the Duvaliers was very 
tranquil, its domestic quiescence marred only by the 
occasional adventurist insurrection involving ludicrously 
small groups of fighters. <One of the insurrections in the 
early 1960's involved seven rebels, five of whom were 
American mercenaries.> The tranquility was enforced against 
opponents brutally and violently. 
The Philippines' independence was less violent. But 
during the Marcos regime a nascent communist guerilla 
conflict had become deeply rooted in many parts of the 
Filipino countryside. The government also struggled with 
violent Moslem separatists on in some areas in the South. 
Marcos was also able to rely on some cultural concepts 
to condone his violence. Filipinos have traditionally 
con51dered violence acceptable as an exercise by the rich of 
their paternalistic power <lakas). Marcos was the 
beneficiary of Filipino tolerance of violence to counteract 
personal shame <hiya> for insults and defeats inflicted by 
tl1e victim of the violence. In 1935, Marcos apparently 
killed a man who had defeated Marcos' father in an election. 
The Filipino Supreme Court excused Ferdinand's actions and 
ordered the charges against him dropped. 
Haitian culture does not encourage overt violence 
against one's opponents. Rather, in keeping with the tenets 
of the dominant voodoo culture, Haitians prefer to resort to 
the spirits <loas> for help in defending themselves from 
threatened harms or inflicting harm on their enemies. If 
life is still unbearable, Haitians have historically chosen 
to flee the unpalatable situation, taking refuge in remote 
areas <a behavior known as marronaqe>. This aversion to 
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public confrontation encouraqes a passive response to 
conflict that is directly contrary to active nonviolence. 
Both cultures include some features conducive to a 
non-violent approach to life. In the Philippines, for 
instance, compassion <awa> is expected from the powerful for 
those vulnerable to that power. When the balance between 
lakas and awa is lost, cultural norms can be upset, costing 
the powerful person legitimacy in the eyes of his neighbors. 
Rural Haitians have long practiced communal forms of mutual 
assistance with major farming tasks, which helped them adapt 
to cooperative strategies against the Duvaliers. 
But overall, the predominant source of inspiration about 
nonviolence in both countries came from sources external to 
either country. Gandhi and Martin Luther Kinq were two 
prominent sources of inspiration (especially Gandhi in the 
Philippines and King in Haiti), as are many of the nonviolent 
exponents of liberation theology. 
At the tactical level, there was also plenty of foreign 
influence, although local innovations proved to be the 
deciding factor in whatever success the popular movements 
enjoyed. The AKKAPKA-sponsored workshops on nonviolence 
were led by representatives of the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation from the United States. Some of the tactics 
used in Haiti were adopted from models outside the country. 
But in each case, at critical periods in the campaign, 
tactics were devised by those on the scene. For example, 
when the crowds around the Filipino military rebels found 
themselves in confrontation with troops loyal to Marcos, 
observers record that people seemed to innovate on the spot 
means of communicating nonviolence to the heavily armed 
soldiers. 
s. The Catholic Church was the most important chaMel of 
ideas &!:>out nonviolence from outside these two cultures. 
Non-Catholic 1ource1 were influential in a limited numl:>er of 
ca••• where there had been extensive involvement in and 
commitment to the community creating high levels of trust. 
Liberation theology was a primarily Catholic invention, 
and the principal vehicle by which notions of active 
nonviolence. entered these two countries. It provided a 
rationale and method of organization (in the base Christian 
communities>, and an undergirding philosophy of concern for 
the poor and awareness of the social structures involved in 
oppression. The Catholic Church was in a position to 
transmit these ideas because of its central and trusted role 
at the heart of both cultures. 
Yet the transmission was not without interference. In 
both countries. a relatively conservative Catholic hierarchy 
had to be converted along with the rest of the populace. Yet 
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converted it was, at least sufficiently to boost the movement 
until the dictators were dispatched (note 3). And the 
visible support of key elements of the hierarchy proved to be 
invaluable in generating broader support among the populace, 
so necessary in overwhelming the government's readiness to 
engage in violence against its own people. The key element 
was the trust placed in the Church by its millions of 
adherents. 
Non-Catholic groups did not have the same level of 
built-in trust in either society. Some Protestants were 
influential with key individuals under circumstances where 
their long-term involvement in meeting human needs had 
established a basis for trust. Thus, Mennonites in Haiti, 
long active in development work in Verettes in the center of 
the country, impressed some activists in the popular 
movement with their witness for nonviolence, communicated in 
the course of common work on translating the Bible into 
Creole. The Fellowship of Reconciliation team that led 
workshops for AKKAPKA gained entry through personal contacts 
that established trust with AKKAPKA leaders. Yet Quakers 
are practically invisible in Haiti, and are hindered in the 
Philippines by their small numbers and lack of long-term 
engagement in the political process. 
6. 'I'ho1e committed to nonviolence a1 a permanent way ot 
life worked 1ucce11fully with tho1e adoptinf nonviolence a1 a 
possibly temiorary strate~, with the underetanding that 
violence wou d play no part in the campaiqn to oust the 
dictators. 
Neither Corazon Aquino nor Cardinal Sin were 
unconditionally committed to nonviolence, not in the way 
that Bishop Francisco Claver or others in the Philippines 
were. And in Haiti, one eyewitness estimated that only 
about one third of the leading activ1st5 in the underground 
oppo:31tion were committed unconditionally to nonviolence. 
They were enthusiastic participants in the cau5e, however, 
because of the general consensus among all the activists 
that this campaign against the Duvaliers would be 
nonviolent. It was this consensus that made the cooperation 
possible -- but in both countries, unity after the dictators 
left was hindered by lack of underlying agreement about the 
legitimacy of violence in social change. 
7. Althouqh conscious application of the tactic• of active 
nonviolence wa1 a necessary cauee of the fall of the two 
dictator1hip1, neither ca11 can be d11crib1d a1 a victory won 
entirely by nonviolence. In both ca1e1 di1affection with the 
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qovernaent aaonq key a111tary leader• and !oreitn foverna1nt1 
played a major part in the cour1e of event1. 
In the Philippines, it is hard to imagine how Aquino 
could have prevailed over Marcos without the catalyzing 
effect of the military mutiny led by Enrile and Ramos. With 
a substantial but hugely outnumbered force camped in Manila, 
Filipinos had a symbol and focal point for their defiance of 
Marcos. Although shooting did not erupt between loyalists 
and the rebels, the potential was always there, especially 
after some key defections to the rebels strengthened their 
hand militarily. Would a focal point outside the armed 
forces, without the potential threat of a violent coup, have 
served the movement as well? · 
In Haiti, the popular movement did not have the open 
support of any elements of the armed forces, so its actions 
are less tainted by the potential for violence. Yet in the 
end, the movement was not the only force at work against 
Duvalier. As in the Philippines, the United States played a 
crucial role in finally convincing the dictator to leave. 
But there is substantial evidence that Duvalier was also 
undone by the loss of military support for his regime. The 
armed forces did not join the popular movement, but certain 
key officers <Gen. Henri Namphy and Col. Williams Regala 
among them) had decided Duvalier was on his way out. By 
late January, troops were doing nothing to prevent 
demonstrations, and Namphy apparently was working with the 
Americans to negotiate a post-Duvalier government. 
a. Both ca1e1 
caapaiCJn• which 
intervention of 
limited aucce11 
culture. 
off er coapellinf evidence that nonviolent 
take a shortcut to their climax due to the 
military and/or diplomatic coercion achieve 
in tran1forminq the political conflict 
Certainly neither political conflict culture has been 
radically transformed. Haitian governments still appear to 
be based on superior force, and democracy is still a dream. 
Aquino's government contends with vigilante violence and 
armed insurrections, which have not yielded to her early 
attempts at peacemaking. Armed might is still necessary to 
retain power in both countries, and improvement is slow or 
nonexistent for the poor and powerless. 
In Haiti, movement activists tend to believe that 
frustrations since Duvalier's fall are due in large part to a 
premature climax in the struggle against Duvalierism. By 
managing Duvalier's departure in a way convenient to Army 
officers and the United States qovernment, the political 
maturation of the opposition may have been prevented, leaving 
it fragmented after the unifying goal of deposing Duvalier 
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was achieved. Had the struggle continued for a few more 
weeks or months, political leadership might have emerged 
strong enough to prevent a reimposition of military rule. 
It is a little harder to make such a case in the 
Philippines. The strong political leadership was there in 
the person of Corazon Aquino. Yet one wonders whether 
another scenario might have been possible, leading to the 
ouster of Marcos without such obvious assistance from 
military rebels, and helping to reshape Filipino political 
culture into a stable democracy. 
9. Forei;n intervention in authoritarian-ruled 1y1tem1 can 
have con1tructive effect if it ~uttre11e1 a democratic 
nonviolent conflict culture without reinforcinf the 
authoritarian reqime. 
Although it seems that American intervention to ease the 
departure of the dictators may have stunted the development 
of democracy in these two countries, not all foreign 
intervention was debilitating. In Haiti, U.S. president 
Jimmy Carter's pressure for greater respect for human rights 
had a very positive effect on events. As a result of 
Carter's influence. Jean-Claude Duvalier relaxed controls on 
the press and on travel outside the country. It was during 
this "Carter spring" that the underground opposition 
blossomed, and became more familiar with and committed to 
ideas about active nonviolence that were circulating 
internationally. 
The "Carter spring" was important as an element in the 
preparation for an even more dramatic turning point: Pope 
John Paul II's visit to Haiti in March of 1983. The Pope 
electrified his Catholic audience by issuing uncompromising 
calls for political and social change in Haiti. It was the 
key moment in unleashing Catholics who had been prepared 
during and after the brief "Carter spring·• for more active 
opposition to Duvalierist dictatorship. 
A similar visit by the Pope in 1981 was important to the 
Philippines. But the real catalyst for change was the 
assassination of Benigno Aquino on his return from exile in 
1983. In this case, the American role was distinctly 
constructive, offering refuge to Aquino from Marcos 
persecution while he worked out his nonviolent strategy for 
change. In addition, American political freedom and 
connections to the Philippines allowed Aquino to remain in 
contact with Marcos opponents even from his exile, and may 
have been important in Corazon's development as a potential 
leader. 
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10. .F'oreirn 
h8lp promote 
regimes. 
intervention to di1couraf1 u11 ••1frat1on uy 
ettect1v1 popular oppo1ition to authoritarian 
This point applies most directly to the Haitian 
situation. As noted above, one of the traditional Haitian 
responses to untenable injustice has been to flee the 
situation, finding refuge in some remote area of the 
country. This marronage served the country well prior to 
independence, and during the first century afterward. But 
as Haiti has become more densely populated, and the central 
government more adept at national soc~al control, marronage 
has ceased to be .available within Hai ti. Instead, larqe 
numbers of poor Haitians who have been fleeing the country, 
especially over the last ten years. 
But the "boat people" began arriving in the United 
States in numbers sufficient to burden this country's 
ability to provide services. As a result, during the early 
1980's the American government cracked down on Haitian 
refugees trying to reach the United States by intercepting 
the leaky Haitian boats close to Haitian waters, and quickly 
returning them to Haiti. 
Observers at the time anticipated that this policy would 
close an important safety valve for tensions within the 
country. The loss of the opportunity for escape accelerated 
the grwoth of pressures within Haitian society for 
improvement in living conditions and political freedoms. 
The unrest was focussed against Duvalier by the growing 
public criticism and opposition emanating from the 
cooperative movement and the Church, especially the tilegliz 
<Haiti's version of the base Christian communities>. With 
nowhere else to go, and no real prospects for economic 
opportunity, the poor who had moved to regional urban 
centers seeking work became the hotbed of opposition 
activity. Without the powder kegs in Gonaives, Cap Haitien, 
and other cities where squatters huddled in filthy slums, 
many of whom might otherwise have emigt'.).ted to the United 
States, the popular movement may never have gained enough 
energy to successfully pressure Duvalier to leave. 
CONCLUSION 
Mediator trainees are urged to be advocates for the 
process, but not for a particular outcome. To advocate for 
an outcome inserts the mediator into the relationship among 
disputing parties in a way that damages their ability ti.) 
make their relationship work. 
A similar principle seems to be at the heart of what we 
can learn from events in Haiti and the Philippines. 
Foreigners have had crucial and positive effects while 
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advocating forcefully for key process values: nonviolence, 
freedoms of speech, press and religion, and political 
pt·ocesses that give equal voice to all social groups. These 
were the messages carried by Jimmy Carter, Pope John Paul 
II, and scores of individuals in religious conferences, 
development projects, and other contacts. The message can 
be conveyed by an individual who has earned respect through 
her commitment to the life of the people, or by a powerful 
political figure uncompromising in her steadfast insistence 
that people be given a voice in their own affairs. The 
message can help when it is received by the poorest members 
of society, or when the only direct listeners are the very 
oppressors themselves <as in Carter's message to Duvalier 
requesting greater respect for human rights>. 
But when the foreign peacemakers begin to move beyond 
advocacy for the process <e.g., for human rights, 
nonviolence, and democracy) to actually bringing about 
thr.ough their own influence specific political outcomes 
--even the removal of a hated dictator -- there is grave 
danger that true peace will get trampled in our rush toward 
our preconceived notions. 
NOTES 
1. A fuller report of our study of Haiti and the 
Philippines is contained in a monograph we have completed 
with support from the United States Institute of Peace. 
2. In fact, the Filipino experience in 1986 bore a much 
stronger resemblance to the earlier Haitian campaigns than 
did the modern Haitian movement. 
3. It is interesting to ·note that the Vatican was 
uncomfortable ~1th the Church's part15an advocacy for Aquino 
in the Ph111ppine5. but apparently had no :3uch feelinqe atout 
the Church 1 s activities in Haiti, ~here the movement-was not 
supporting any particular contestant for power. 
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